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Abstract
This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We charac-
terize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since
the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed in-
comes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find
unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g. from the middle class to the poor and the
rich. Furthermore, we show that majority voting can lead to an inefficiently low level of
taxation – despite a right-skewed income distribution. Hence, the classical over-provision
result might turn around, once tax evasion is taken into account.
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1 Introduction
You’ve got to be careful about this rhetoric, we’re only going to tax the rich. ... The rich
in America happen to be the small business owners. ... Just remember, when you’re talking
about, oh, we’re just going to run up the taxes on a certain number of people – first of all,
real rich people figure out how to dodge taxes. And the small business owners end up paying
a lot of the burden of this taxation.
George W. Bush, 9th Aug. 2004.1
One of the corner stones of the political-economic literature is the analysis of voting over
tax schedules. The seminal contributions by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and
Richard (1981) study majority voting on tax rates, where the median income receiver deter-
mines the political outcome. As long as the income distribution is skewed to the right, such
that the pivotal agent’s income falls short of the average income, the median voter equilibrium
is characterized by an inefficiently high level of taxation.2 This paper studies whether these
results still hold if taxpayers can cheat on their taxes. While the empirical importance of tax
evasion is well-documented,3 there is no comprehensive analysis of income tax evasion within
the classical median voter framework. Our approach attempts to close this gap in the literature.
Allowing taxpayers to conceal a part of their income from taxation alters the standard re-
sults in several interesting ways. First of all, individual preferences over alternative tax rates
are no longer determined by their true, but rather by their taxed income. Second, the ranking
of agents according to true income does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed in-
comes. This implies that voters’ preferences for taxation are not necessarily monotonic in their
true income. If e.g. taxpayers from the top of the income distribution can more easily conceal
income than individuals with intermediate income levels – as suggested in the quote by George
W. Bush – the taxed income of the ‘real rich’ might be lower than the taxed income of the mid-
dle class respectively the ‘small business owners’. If this is the case, high income groups ceteris
paribus prefer higher taxes than voters from the middle class. An untypical coalition of poor
and rich would emerge, with both groups voting for higher taxes. Consequently, the tax system
would redistribute from the middle class to the poor and to the rich.4 The non-monotonicity of
preferences over taxes in true income furthermore implies that the pivotal taxpayer – the agent
with the median taxed income – does not necessarily correspond to the voter with the median
income.
Taking into account tax evasion, has also a strong impact on the welfare properties of the
median voter equilibrium. The underlying reason is that in our framework there are two lay-
1See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-3.html
2For an overview of this literature see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000).
3In the US, for example, the IRS estimated the ‘tax gap’ – the difference between actual and hypothetical tax
revenues without evasion – to amount to a total of approximately $350 billion in the year 2001 (Sawicky, 2005). Frey
and Feld (2002) assess the income tax gap for Switzerland at more than 17%.
4A similar example of an ‘ends against the middle’-conflict is discussed in Epple and Romano (1996).
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ers of heterogeneity among agents which drive a wedge between the social planer’s and the
decisive voter’s incentives. One is the ‘income gap’ – the well-studied difference between the
mean and the median voter’s income. If the pivotal taxpayer has an income below the aver-
age, he considers costs of taxation which are too low from the planner’s perspectives. Hence,
the tax rate in the voting equilibrium will be inefficiently high. In the presence of tax evasion,
however, we need to compare the average taxed income with the taxed income of the decisive
voter in order to determine the welfare characteristics of the political equilibrium. That is, next
to the income gap, we also have to consider differences in the level of evasion – the ‘evasion
gap’. If the decisive voter conceals less than the average, his taxed income will ceteris paribus
rise (as compared to the mean taxed income). This, in turn, provides the pivotal taxpayer with
an incentive to vote for an inefficiently low level of taxation. Apparently, this incentive works
against the standard effect from the income gap. If the median voter’s taxed income is above
the average, the evasion gap dominates. In that case, majority voting leads to an inefficiently
low level of taxation, once tax evasion is taken into account. Interestingly, this can occur even if
the distribution of true income is skewed to the right.
Our approach combines the literature on income tax evasion (see e.g. Andreoni et al., 1998)
and the political-economic literature on voting over taxation (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
Thereby, we deviate from the standard model of income tax evasion (Allingham and Sandmo,
1972; Yitzhaki, 1974), where risk-averse taxpayers trade off the costs of detection against the
tax savings in case they get away with the evasion. Instead, we consider risk-neutral agents
who face convex costs of concealing income. In this vein, our approach is similar to models of
firm evasion (e.g. Cremer and Gahvari, 1993; Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005). We study the case
where the opportunities – respectively the costs – to conceal income vary with income. This
captures the fact that different income groups derive their earnings from different sources –
capital or labour income, respectively income from self-employed or employed labour – which
determine their chances to dodge taxes (see e.g. Roth et al., 1989). Within this framework we
study tax evasion and majority voting over a proportional income tax, which is used to finance
a public good.
There are only a few other contributions on majority voting in a similar context.5 Borck
(2003) analyzes voting over redistribution with tax evasion. Evasion is modeled along the lines
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and tax revenues are used to finance a lump-sum transfer.
Roine (2006) studies a model of majority voting on taxes in the presence of legal tax avoidance.
Agents make a discrete choice, either to invest a fixed amount and explore a given avoidance
opportunity or to declare all their income. Roine (2003) generalizes the approach, considering
the case of continuous tax avoidance and endogenous labour supply. Similar as is our paper,
these contributions show that tax evasion respectively avoidance typically drives a wedge be-
tween the ranking of pre-tax and taxed income. In turn, this will shifting the position of the
decisive voter away from the median income receiver, which triggers similar patterns of redis-
5In a slightly different approach, Barbaro and Südekum (2006) study voting over tax exemptions. Similar as in
our analysis, they find that the decisive voter does not necessarily correspond to the median income receiver.
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tribution as in our analysis. In the models of Borck (2003) and Roine (2003, 2006), however, vot-
ers’ preferences regarding taxation satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing. As the
median voter theorem is in general not applicable and a voting equilibrium may not exist, the
authors use numerical examples to discuss the properties of different equilibria. In addition,
non of the papers addresses the welfare implications of tax evasion respectively avoidance.
Hence, the welfare analysis in the present paper is novel in the literature.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model and
analyze the agents’ evasion behavior. Section 3 studies the taxpayers’ voting incentives. We
characterize the voting equilibrium and discuss possible patterns of redistribution associated
with different types of equilibria. In section 4 we study the welfare properties of the political
equilibrium. A brief discussion of our main findings concludes the paper.
2 Basic Model
An agent i receives an exogenous pre-tax income yi, 0 < yi < ∞, which is subject to a linear
income tax at rate τ , 0 < τ < 1. The taxpayer chooses to conceal a share ei ∈ [0, 1] of his
income. Hiding income from authorities entails (non tax-deductible) costs of c(yi, ei), related
to the individual’s evasion efforts. These costs also depend on the income level, as different
income groups – which may derive their incomes from different sources (e.g. capital or labour,
self-employed or employed labour) – face different opportunities to dodge taxes. Throughout
our analysis we assume that c(., .) is continuously differentiable with ce(yi, ei) ≥ 0, ce(yi, 0) = 0,
ce(yi, 1) =∞ and cee(yi, ei) > 0.6 With a fixed probability p an evader gets detected and has to
pay full taxes plus a penalty proportional to the taxes evaded (Yitzhaki, 1974).7 If the taxpayer
gets away with the evasion, only the declared income is taxed.
Note that our set up, employing individual evasion costs,8 can be interpreted as a reduced
form model of the case where the detection probability depends on the share of income con-
cealed as well as on the income level. While this alternative approach would not alter the main
results of the study, the analysis would become quite tediously.
The expected after-tax income is then given by
EY (yi, ei) = (1− p) (yi (1− τ) + τeiyi) + p (yi (1− τ)− τeiyi (s− 1))− c(yi, ei)
which simplifies to
EY (yi, ei) = yi (1− τ + eiτ (1− ps))− c(yi, ei), (1)
where s > 1 denotes the penalty rate. Expected fines are assumed to be such that ps < 1. Hence,
evading income yields a positive return. Note, that for the special case p = 0 our approach can
6We use ce(yi, ei) and cee(yi, ei) for ∂c(.,.)∂e and
∂2c(.,.)
∂e2
, respectively. Equivalently, cey(yi, ei) denotes ∂c(.,.)∂e∂y .
7Our results also hold for the case originally studied by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), where the penalty is
proportional to the concealed income rather than taxes evaded.
8For other models of individual tax evasion which consider individual evasion costs see e.g. Slemrod (2001),
Chang and Lai (2004).
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be interpreted as a model of legal tax avoidance, similar to Roine (2006). As we consider a
continuous evasion respectively avoidance decision, however, our framework is more general.
The preferences of risk neutral agents are characterized by an additively separable utility
function defined over expected income EY (., .) and a public good g,
U(yi, ei, g) = EY (yi, ei) + V (g), (2)
with V (.) being continuously increasing and strictly concave. Taxpayers choose ei so as to
maximize (2). The first order condition to this problem,
yiτ (1− ps) = ce(yi, ei), (3)
characterizes e∗i , the optimal share of income concealed, for a given set of policy variables and
an income yi.9 Using the implicit function theorem on (3) one can easily derive
∂e∗i
∂p
< 0,
∂e∗i
∂s
< 0,
∂e∗i
∂τ
> 0.
While stricter tax enforcement – an increase in the detection probability and/or the penalty
rate – will reduce evasion, a rise in the tax rate will trigger more evasion. Note, that this last
result is at odds with the classical model of income tax evasion. For the case of risk-averse
taxpayers and a penalty structure as considered above (i.e. proportional to taxes evaded), non-
increasing absolute risk aversion is sufficient to show that evasion decreases with higher tax
rates (Yitzhaki, 1974). As we consider risk neutral agents who face convex costs of concealing
income, we get the more intuitive result that evasion increases as taxes rise.10
From (3) we get
∂e∗i
∂yi
=
τ (1− ps)− cey(yi, e∗i )
cee(yi, e∗i )
. (4)
Although marginal benefits of evasion are (linearly) increasing in income, the sign of ∂e/∂y is
ambiguous and depends on the cross derivative of the cost function – i.e. on how the marginal
costs of concealing change with the income level. If the inequality
cey(yi, e∗i ) ≥ τ (1− ps) (5)
holds, the share of concealed income e∗i is non-increasing in income. In this case, the marginal
costs to dodge taxes are strongly increasing in income, such that richer taxpayers would de-
clare a larger share of their true income than poorer agents.11 However, if the marginal costs
of concealing are declining or not too strongly increasing in income, condition (5) would be
9We focus on interior solutions by assuming ce(yi, 0) = 0 and ce(yi, 1) = ∞. The second order condition is
fulfilled since cee(yi, ei) > 0.
10Following a similar modelling approach, the same result is derived in the literature on tax evasion of firms (see
e.g. Cremer and Gahvari, 1993; Stöwhase and Traxler, 2005).
11For the special case where (5) holds with equality – which would be the case if e.g. c(yi, ei) were linear in yi –
the share of income concealed e∗i would be the same for all income levels.
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violated. In this case, the share of income concealed would increase as income rises: Richer
taxpayers would conceal a larger share of their income as compared to poorer agents. In the
following we will consider both possible cases.
Finally, we specify the public sector of the economy. We consider a continuum of individu-
als with incomes distributed according to a continuously differentiable cumulative distribution
function F (y) with y ∈ [yl, yh], 0 < yl < yh < ∞. In the following y¯ denotes the mean and ym
the median of the income distribution. Revenues from taxes and fines are used to finance the
public good. With a marginal rate of transformation of unity we get
g = τ
∫ yh
yl
y (1− e∗ (y) (1− ps)) dF (y), (6)
where e∗ (y) denotes the solution to (3) as a function of income. Let us define
x(yi) ≡ yi (1− e∗ (yi) (1− ps)) , (7)
the – in expectation terms12 – taxed income of a taxpayer with true income yi. Substituting for
x(yi) we can express (6) as
g(τ) = τ
∫ yh
yl
x(y)dF (y) ≡ τ x¯, (8)
where x¯ denotes the mean taxed income.
3 Voting with Tax Evasion
Let us now turn to the endogenous choice of the tax rate within this framework. We first study
the political equilibrium under majority voting. In the next section we analyze the tax policy
chosen by a welfare maximizing planner. The following timing of events is considered: First,
the tax rate is determined (by voters respectively the planner). Second, taxpayers choose their
optimal level of evasion and finally the revenues collected from taxation and auditing deter-
mine the public good level as studied above. Throughout this analysis the detection probability
as well as the penalty rate are taken as exogenously fixed.13
3.1 Voting Equilibrium
The most preferred tax rate of an agent with income yi is given by the solution to
max
τ
EY (yi, e∗i ) + V (g(τ)),
12Note that x(yi) consists of the declare income, yi(1− e∗i ), as well as of the ‘base’ for the expected fine, ps yie∗i .
13As p is kept constant, we normalize the public costs of providing a certain auditing level to zero. Note further,
that our analysis neglects the case where the government can not credibly commit to an auditing policy.
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with e∗i and g(τ) from (3) and (8), respectively. Making use of (3), we get the following first
order condition:
V ′
∂g
∂τ
= x(yi), (9)
with ∂g/∂τ derived in the appendix. There we also show that for sufficiently large V ′(.) the sec-
ond order condition for this problem holds for all yi ∈ [yl, yh]. Hence, condition (9) determines
the most preferred tax rate of an agent where the marginal benefits equal her marginal costs
from taxation. While the former are equal for all taxpayers, the latter depend on x(yi), the taxed
income of an individual with true income yi. From (9) immediately follows that the preferred
tax rate is decreasing in x: The higher the taxed income, the more a taxpayer contributes to the
public good and the lower is the desired tax rate. Ranking taxpayers according to their taxed
income then yields the (reversed) ranking of voters’ preferences for taxation. As preferences
are single-peaked, the median voter theorem is applicable (Black, 1948). The decisive voter is
then characterized by the median level of x(yi). This result is summarized in
Proposition 1 Let the cumulative distribution of x = x(y) be given by H(x). The political equilibrium
is characterized by
V ′
∂g
∂τ
= xˆ
with H(xˆ) = 12 .
Proof. See Appendix.
The majority voting outcome characterized in Proposition 1 is analogous to the classical
result (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In the absence of tax evasion,
preferences for taxation can be ranked according to the true income of taxpayers and the median
income voter is pivotal. In our framework, however, agents are heterogenous along the true
income as well as the level of evasion – which boils down to a distribution of taxed incomes.
The political equilibrium is then determined by the taxpayer with median taxed income xˆ.
3.2 Position of the Median Voter
We now have to ask whether the decisive voter still correspond to the taxpayer with median
true income. In order to address this question, we have to check if x(y) is monotonic in y. From
(7) we can easily derive
∂x(yi)
∂yi
= (1− e∗i (1− ps))− yi
∂e∗i
∂yi
(1− ps) . (10)
The first term on the right hand side of (10) is positive and depicts the increase in declared
respectively taxed income associated with a rise in yi. The second term captures the change
in the evasion behavior due to an increase in true income. Since this second effect might be
negative, the sign of ∂x/∂y is ambiguous and crucially depends on ∂e∗/∂y from (4), which
itself is determined by the sign of cey.14 We can distinguish between three different cases:
14Compare condition (5) and the discussion in section 2.
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1. If ∂e∗/∂y ≤ 0 holds (for all income levels), the share of income concealed e∗i decreases
and taxable income x(yi) monotonically increases in incomes. In this case, preferences for
taxation are monotonic in true income and the median voter corresponds to the taxpayer
with the median income.
2. If ∂e∗/∂y is positive but the first term in (10) dominates the second for all income levels,
we still get ∂x/∂y > 0. Preferences for taxation are monotonic in the true income and the
decisive voter is the median income receiver.
3. With ∂e∗/∂y being positive, however, there might exist income levels where the second
term in (10) dominates the first. In this case, agents would increase the share of income
concealed such that the higher level of evasion outbalances the income increase. Con-
sequently, taxed income is (locally) decreasing in true income. Voters’ preferences for
taxation are no longer monotonic in income. As a consequence, the median voter might
differ from the median income receiver.
Case Condition on cey Properties
1. ∀y ∈ [yl, yh] : cey ≥ τ(1− ps) ∂e∗∂y ≤ 0 ∂x∂y > 0
2. ∀y ∈ [yl, yh] : τ(1− ps)− ψ(y) ≤ cey < τ(1− ps) ∂e∗∂y > 0 ∀y ∈ [yl, yh] : ∂x∂y ≥ 0
3. ∃y ∈ [yl, yh] : cey < τ(1− ps)− ψ(y) ∂e∗∂y > 0 ∃y ∈ [yl, yh] : ∂x∂y < 0
Table 1
One can distinguish between these cases according to the value of cey, which determines
the size and sign of ∂e/∂y. In Table 1 we used (4) in (10) to derive thresholds for the three
possible scenarios, where ψ(y) is defined as
ψ(y) ≡ 1− e
∗(y)(1− ps)
y(1− ps) cee.
If the marginal costs of concealing are strongly increasing in income such that (5) holds, we are
in case 1. If (5) is violated, we are either in case 2 or case 3. If cey does not fall too short of the
threshold τ (1− ps), the condition for case 2 might hold for all income levels. The smaller is
cey, the more likely we arrive at case 3. Note, however, that it is not at all necessary for cey to be
negative, to get the third case.15 Even if the marginal costs of evasion are increasing in income,
i.e. cey > 0, the ranking of taxed income can differ from the ranking of true income.
These findings lead us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 1. If cey ≥ τ(1 − ps) − ψ(y) holds for all income levels y ∈ [yl, yh] we get ∂x(y)∂y ≥ 0
for all agents. Voters’ preferences for taxation are monotonic in income and the median income receiver
is pivotal, xˆ = x(ym).
15Let us further remark that ψ(y) tends to decreases in y. The numerator of ψ(y) decreases in y as in this range of
cey we have ∂e/∂y > 0. In addition, the denominator increases with y. Given that these are the dominant effects,
i.e. if ceey is not too strongly positive, we get ∂ψ/∂y < 0. Hence, for a given level of cey , the third case is particularly
likely to hold for high income levels.
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2. If there exits an income y ∈ [yl, yh] such that cey < τ(1 − ps) − ψ(y), we locally get ∂x(y)∂y < 0.
Voters’ preferences for taxation are non-monotonic in y. The decisive voter will be different from the
median income receiver, xˆ 6= x(ym),
2.a if ∃y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and @y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) > x(ym).
In this case we get xˆ < x(ym).
2.b if @y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and ∃y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) > x(ym).
In this case we get xˆ > x(ym).
2.c if ∃y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and ∃y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) > x(ym).
In this case we either get xˆ < x(ym), xˆ > x(ym) or xˆ = x(ym).
2.d Otherwise, if @y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and @y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) > x(ym),
the median income receiver is pivotal, xˆ = x(ym).
Proof. See Appendix.
While Proposition 2.1 subsumes scenarios 1 and 2 from Table 1, Proposition 2.2 specifies
evasion costs which correspond to the third scenario. For this last case, the pattern of tax eva-
sion is such that taxed income – and thereby the ranking of preferences – is non-monotonic in
pre-tax income. The subcases 2.a – 2.c identify conditions under which this non-monotonicity
drives a wedge between the position of the median voter and the agent with the median in-
come. This occurs, if e.g. some taxpayers with above median-income strongly conceal in-
come such that their taxed income falls short of the median income receiver’s taxed income. In
this case 2.a, the decisive voter has a lower taxed income than the agent with median income.
Hence, the tax rate (as well as the public good level) in the voting equilibrium will be too high
from the perspective of the median income receiver. The opposite holds true for case 2.b: if
some taxpayers from the lower half of the income distribution have a higher taxed income
than the agent with median income, the decisive voter has a higher taxed income and therefore
prefers a lower level of taxation as compared to the taxpayer with the median income. In case
2.c, where at the same time some agents from the upper half of the income distribution have
a lower and some voters from the lower half have a higher taxed income than the median in-
come receiver, the tax policy in the political equilibrium will (typically) be different from the
policy preferred by the median income agent. Without any further restrictions, however, one
cannot determine the direction of this deviation. Finally, in the case characterized in part 2.d of
the proposition, the non-monotonicity of preferences does not alter the position of the median
income receiver as the decisive voter. Hence, the political equilibrium will be equivalent to the
one which emerges in the case specified in Proposition 2.1.
What can we say about the empirical plausibility of the case specified in Proposition 2.2,
i.e. that cey is sufficiently small. Let us assume for the moment, that the marginal costs of
concealing are mainly determined by the source of the (exogenous) income. Furthermore, con-
sider the case, where the share of income derived from capital – as compared to labour – or
self-employed – as compared to employed labour – is increasing in pre-tax income. Given that
income from capital respectively self-employment are easier to conceal, low or even negative
9
values for cey appear highly plausible. Hence, a non-monotonicity of taxed income as specified
in Proposition 2.2 seems to be of empirical relevance.16 Anecdotal evidence which supports
this view is discussed by Bergström and Gidehag (2003). They report that “more than half of the
hairdressing employers in Sweden have a taxed income that is less than half of what a full-time employed
hairdresser earns per annum ... .” While there could be various reasons for this observation, the
authors argue that the key explanation are the greater evasion opportunities among employers
as compared to employees.
3.3 Tax Evasion and Redistribution
The non-monotonicity of preferences in income has also strong implications for the pattern
of redistribution within our framework. To illustrate this point, let us discuss some exam-
ples. Figure 1 and 2 show the true income y (horizontal axis) plotted against the taxed income
x(y) (vertical axis) for two possible evasion cost functions resulting in different shapes of x(y).
Without tax evasion, taxed income would equal true income. A vertical deviation from the 45
degree line then captures the amount of income concealed from taxation (in expectation terms)
at a give income level y.
Figure 1: Voting Equilibrium and Patterns of Redistribution, Example 1
The first figure describes the case suggested by George W. Bush in the quote from above:
‘real rich people figure out how to dodge taxes’ – they conceal a huge part of their income. The
voting equilibrium is then supported by an unusual coalition of rich and poor, taxpayers with
y ∈ [yl, yˆ0] respectively y ∈ [yˆ1, yh]. In equilibrium ‘the small business owners end up paying a lot of
the burden of this taxation’ – there is redistribution from the middle class, agents with y ∈ [yˆ0, yˆ1]
16Models of risk averse taxpayers typically assume a decreasing absolute risk aversion, which also implies that
the share of income concealed increases as income rises. Compare e.g. Andreoni et al. (1998, p.838), Borck (2003).
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who have a taxed income above xˆ, to the poor and the rich, who both have a taxed income
x(y) < xˆ.
A similar example, which also corresponds to the group of scenarios specified in Proposi-
tion 2.2.a, is given in Figure 2. Here, the coalition supporting the equilibrium tax rate is formed
by the poor with y ∈ [yl, yˆ0] and the ‘upper-middle-class’ with y ∈ [yˆ1, yˆ2]. These two groups
benefit from redistribution to the disadvantage of the rich, taxpayers with y ∈ [yˆ2, yh], as well as
the ‘lower-middle-class’ with y ∈ [yˆ0, yˆ1]. While this examples shows the typical redistribution
from the top to the bottom of the income distribution, we also observe an unusual direction of
redistribution among the middle class – i.e. from the lower to the upper part of this group with
intermediate income levels. To put it into the terms of the observation from Bergström and
Gidehag (2003) (see above): There is redistribution ‘from the Swedish hairdressers to their em-
ployers’. The reason here is again that locally an income increase leads to an over-proportional
increase in evasion such that the ranking of the taxed income among the middle class gets
reversed.
Figure 2: Voting Equilibrium and Patterns of Redistribution, Example 2
The emergence of such unusual patterns of redistribution in the context of tax evasion (re-
spectively tax avoidance) is not new in the literature.17 Both Borck (2003) and Roine (2003, 2006)
find scenarios similar to the one described in Figure 1. Borck (2003) considers a society consist-
ing of three agents, who can either evade nothing at all or everything. A similar approach is
provided by Roine (2006), who studies (legal) tax avoidance. His taxpayers can either invest a
fixed amount to reduce their tax base by a fixed share or they declare their full income. While
the median voter theorem is typically not applicable in these frameworks, both authors discuss
numerical examples of equilibria, where the tax system distributes from the middle class to
the poor and the rich taxpayer. Similar cases are derived in Roine (2003), studying a contin-
17An interesting example of an ‘ends against the middle’-conflicts is also discussed in Epple and Romano (1996).
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uous tax avoidance decision together with endogenous labour supply. In comparison to our
approach, however, these contributions excludes many interesting patterns of redistribution.
In particular, these models can only capture a non-monotonicity of taxed income at the top of
the income distribution. Hence, cases like the one depicted in Figure 2, where taxed income is
reversed among the middle class, are neglected in their studies. The same holds for scenarios
characterized by part 2.b and 2.c of Proposition 2.
4 Welfare Analysis
In order to discuss the welfare properties of the voting equilibrium, we first derive the wel-
fare maximizing policy within our framework. The social planner maximizes aggregate utility,
taking into account taxpayers’ responses in their evasion behavior to changes in the tax rate.
Using e∗ (y) and (8) in (2), the planners’ problem becomes
max
τ
∫ yh
yl
EY (y, e∗ (y))dF (y) + V (g(τ)).
The Samuelson condition to this problem is given by
V ′
∂g
∂τ
= x¯, (11)
where we made use of (3) and (7).18 Condition (11) characterizes the welfare maximizing tax
rate and the budget constraint from (8) determines the corresponding public good level. In
the welfare maximizing equilibrium, the mean marginal costs from taxation, given by x¯, are
equal to the (total) marginal benefits from a increase in the public good provision. Using this
solution as a benchmark, we can derive the welfare properties of the voting equilibrium from
Proposition 1.19
Proposition 3 The political equilibrium is characterized by (a) an inefficiently high, (b) an ineffi-
ciently low, (c) a welfare maximizing level of taxation and public good provision iff (a) xˆ < x¯, (b)
xˆ > x¯, respectively (c) xˆ = x¯.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 is equivalent to the welfare result typically derived in the majority voting lit-
erature: Neglecting tax evasion and considering an income distribution which is skewed to the
right, the pivotal taxpayer has an income below the average – he faces lower marginal costs of
taxation than the mean costs considered by the social planner. Hence, the political equilibrium
will be characterized by too high taxes and an inefficiently high level of public good provi-
sion (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The political equilibrium in our
18The second order condition is derived in the appendix.
19Note that the policy characterized by (11) is not first best. In the following we call a policy ‘inefficient’, if it
results in a lower level of welfare as compared to the benchmark from (11).
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framework has the same properties, as long as the decisive voter has a taxed income below the
mean, xˆ < x¯ (case a). If the opposite holds true, i.e. if the decisive taxpayer has a taxed income
xˆ > x¯ (case b), majority voting results in inefficiently low levels of taxation and public good
provision. For the special case where xˆ = x¯ (case c), voting introduces no distortion as the
pivotal taxpayer chooses the same tax rate as the social planer.
For which pattern of evasion respectively for which income distribution does majority vot-
ing now result in an over-, under-, or an efficient provision of public goods? One straightfor-
ward example where we get an over-provision of public goods (case a), is an income distribu-
tion F (y) with ym < y¯ together with a constant share of evasion, e∗(y) = e∗ ∀y.20 It is obvious,
that in this case there must hold xˆ < x¯. Using (7) we can write xˆ < x¯ as
yˆj (1− e∗(yˆj) (1− ps)) <
∫
y (1− e∗ (y) (1− ps)) dF (y), (12)
with yˆj being the income of the pivotal taxpayer, xˆ = x(yˆj).21 If e∗ is independent of y, tax
evasion reduces the marginal costs of taxation for all agents by the same proportion. Tech-
nically this means that condition (12) boils down to yˆj < y¯. Since we assume ∂e∗/∂y = 0,
preferences are monotonic in income (compare Proposition 2.1) and the pivotal taxpayer has
median income: xˆ = x(ym) and yˆj = ym. With a constant share of income concealed, majority
voting therefore results in an inefficiently high level of taxation as long as the distribution of
true incomes fulfills ym < y¯.
If we turn to the more general case where e∗ varies with income, this result might turn
around – despite a distribution of true income with ym < y¯. The pattern of evasion can be such
that the decisive voter faces marginal cost of taxation which are above the mean costs (case c in
Proposition 3), where we would get an under-provision of public goods. To address this point
in more detail, we express xˆ ≥ x¯ as(∫
ye∗ (y) dF (y)− yˆje∗(yˆj)
)
(1− ps) ≥ y¯ − yˆj . (13)
While the right hand side of condition (13) depicts the gap between the mean income and a
decisive voter’s true income yˆj ,22 the left hand side captures the gap between the mean level of
income concealed and the (expected) amount concealed by a pivotal taxpayer j. If this agent
j conceals less income than the average, the left hand side is positive. If this ‘evasion gap’ is
bigger than the ‘income gap’ such that condition (13) holds, majority voting would result in an
inefficiently low level of taxes and public goods.
20This would be the case if e.g. c(yi, ei) were linear in income. (Compare footnote 11.)
21Note, that x(y) from (7) is non-injective if x is non-monotonic in y. Hence, there might exist different levels of
true income yˆj and yˆk 6=j for which xˆ = x(yˆj) = x(yˆk) holds. (Compare Figure 1 and 2 from above.) If e∗(y) = e∗ ∀y,
however, it follows from (10) that x(y) is injective and there is one unique income level yˆj where xˆ = x(yˆj) holds.
22Note, that the income of the pivotal taxpayer is not necessarily equal to the median income (compare Proposi-
tion 2). Moreover, there might be several income levels yˆj and yˆk 6=j for which xˆ = x(yˆj) = x(yˆk) holds (compare
footnote 21). It is obvious, however, that if (13) holds for yˆj it also has to hold for all other yˆk 6=j .
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Consider for example a uniform distribution of true incomes. Without tax evasion, majority
voting would not introduce any distortion, as median and mean income coincide. If, however,
agents differ with respect to the share of income concealed, the heterogeneity in tax evasion will
drive a wedge between the decisive voter’s and the mean marginal costs of taxation. Given that
the median voter conceals less income than the average, he ceteris paribus faces marginal costs
of taxation which are above the social costs considered by the planner. In terms of (13), the left
hand side would be positive. If the taxed income is monotonic in true income as characterized
in Proposition 2.1, the pivotal taxpayer has median income, yˆj = ym. Since for a uniform
distribution there holds ym = y¯, the right hand side of (13) equals zero. Hence, condition (13)
holds and we get an under-provision of public goods.
The intuition for this result is that the planner takes into account the mean taxed income
x¯ and thereby also the mean level of income concealed. If the pivotal taxpayer conceals less
than the average, this will provide him with an incentive to vote for a level of taxation which
is inefficiently low. As long as this is the only wedge between the median voter’s and the
planner’s incentives – i.e. if there is no income gap – it determines the welfare properties of
the voting equilibrium. In the case of an income distribution which is skewed to the right, the
incentive to vote for a ‘too low’ tax – stemming from a below-average level of evasion (evasion
gap) – would work into the opposite direction as the incentives to vote for ‘too high’ taxes –
related to a below-average income (income gap). If the former incentive dominates the latter,
condition (13) is fulfilled and the voting equilibrium is characterized by an under-provision of
public goods. For the special case where condition (13) holds with equality, the two distortions
– the one related to the income gap and the other to the evasion gap – exactly offset each other.
The pivotal agent has mean taxed income xˆ = x¯ and the majority voting outcome would also
be welfare maximizing (compare case c in Proposition 3).23
Finally, we shall link the welfare discussion with the analysis from the previous section.
As we know from Proposition 3, a necessary condition for an under-provision of public goods
is a distribution of taxed incomes H(x) which fulfills xˆ > x¯. Given that the distribution of
true income F (y) is skewed to the right, condition (13) is more likely to hold if we are in the
case characterized by Proposition 2.2: If the taxed income is non-monotonic in true income
– in particular, if the taxed income decreases for the very rich (as in Figure 1) – tax evasion
can transform a right-skewed distribution F (y) into a distribution H(x) which satisfies (13).24
Interestingly, however, one can easily find examples of an under-provision of public goods
(despite a right-skewed F (y)), where the taxed income is monotonically increasing (compare
Proposition 2.1) but sufficiently concave. This is typically the case if ∂e∗/∂y > 0 (compare
Table 1 from above), i.e. if the share of income concealed increases with higher incomes.25 The
intuition behind this point is straightforward: If ‘only the little people pay taxes’, as convicted tax
23The decisive voter could also conceal more than the average taxpayer. In this case, the left hand side of (13)
would be negative and the incentive from tax evasion would only amplify the political distortion associated with a
below-average income of the pivotal agent.
24In Appendix A.3 we provide an example for this case.
25A numerical example which illustrates this case is discussed in Appendix A.3. In order to address this point
more formally, we would have to make some assumptions on the evasion cost function c(y, e).
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evader Leona Helmsley put it, – i.e. if tax compliance is high among the poor and the middle
class but the rich heavily engage in tax evasion – this will widen the evasion gap and thereby
work in favor of an under-provision result. Hence, if the rich are indeed more prone to evade
taxes than the rest of the society, the over-provision of public goods under majority voting
associated with a right-skewed income distribution might turn into an under-provision, once
tax evasion is taken into account.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced tax evasion into a simple model of majority voting on taxes. Allowing
taxpayers to conceal income, has strong implications for the political-economic analysis: First
of all, individual preferences over tax rates are determined by their taxed rather than their true
pre-tax income. Given that the opportunities to dodge taxes vary between different income
groups, some taxpayers are more inclined to evade taxes than others. As a consequence, the
ranking of agents according to true income does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of
taxed incomes. Hence, voters’ preferences over tax rates may be non-monotonic in their pre-tax
income. If this is the case, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. This
also implies the existence of voting equilibria based e.g. upon a coalition of poor and rich, with
both groups voting for higher taxes than the middle class. More generally, we observe redis-
tribution from taxpayers with lower to individuals with (relatively) higher pre-tax incomes, if
the latter conceal sufficiently more taxes than the former. Therefore, the distributional conflict
emerges not only along income lines but also between those who comply with tax laws and
those who cheat on taxes. Given the empirical relevance of tax evasion, tax compliance rep-
resents an important dimension of redistribution, which so far received only little attention in
the political-economic literature on redistributive taxation (Borck, 2003; Roine, 2003, 2006).
In addition to distributive consequences, tax evasion has also a strong impact on the welfare
properties of the voting equilibrium. As in our framework agents differ with respect to their
income as well as their level of evasion, there are now two layers of heterogeneity which drive
a wedge between the social planer’s and the voters’ incentives. Only considering the income
heterogeneity – i.e. neglecting tax evasion – majority voting results in an inefficiently high level
of taxation and public good provision, as long as the pivotal taxpayer has a pre-tax income
below the average. In order to determine the welfare proprieties of the voting equilibrium in
the case of tax evasion, however, one has to compare the decisive voter’s taxed income with the
average taxed income. That is, next to the ‘income gap’, we also have to consider the difference
in the level of evasion – the ‘evasion gap’. If the decisive voter conceals less than the average,
this will ceteris paribus raise his taxed income (as compared to the mean taxed income). In
turn, this provides the pivotal taxpayer with an incentive to vote for an inefficiently low level
of taxation. Hence, the incentive from a below average level of tax evasion works against the
standard effect from a below average income. If the median voter’s taxed income is above the
average, the evasion gap dominates. In this case, majority voting would leads to an inefficiently
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low level of taxation. Interestingly, this can occur even if the distribution of true income is
skewed to the right.
How relevant are our findings from an empirical point of view? Despite a widespread be-
lief that the ‘real rich people figure out how to dodge taxes’ and hence ‘only the little people pay taxes’,
the lack of data on income specific levels of tax evasion severely limits the proper empirical
assessment of these conjectures.26 Nevertheless, there are several considerations why tax eva-
sion may indeed be higher among the rich: Standard theory, for example, emphasizes the fact
that decreasing absolute risk aversion triggers higher levels of evasion among the rich (see e.g.
Cowell, 1990). In addition, evasion opportunities systematically differ between different in-
come groups. As richer taxpayers typically derive large shares of their incomes from sources
with relatively easy evasion opportunities (e.g. capital incomes, self-employed earnings), they
have more chances to cheat on taxes than those who mainly derive wage incomes (see e.g.
Roth et al., 1989, p. 137). Precisely this latter argument triggers the discussed implications for
redistribution and welfare in our model.
With respect to the welfare analysis we should add that the observed income distributions –
the distribution of declared respectively taxed incomes – is skewed to the right in most modern
economies.27 One could argue that this fact renders the case of an inefficiently low level of
taxation in the voting equilibrium a mere theoretical possibility. In practice, however, tax rates
are hardly determined by one-dimensional majority election (not to mention non-linear tax
schedules). Moreover, recent evidence also highlights the importance of non-selfish motives for
individual voting behavior (e.g. Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006). Hence, it might be misleading
to take the observed income distributions as clear-cut evidence for an inefficiently high level
of taxation in a majority voting equilibrium. In any case, we are convinced that the incentive
related to the evasion gap – which tends to work in favor of an inefficiently low level of taxation
– provides an important argument, so far neglected in the welfare discussion. If the evasion gap
does not dominate, it at least mitigates the distortion associated with a right-skewed income
distribution in the context of majority voting.
26The few existing empirical studies on the relationship between tax evasion and income do not provide a clear
picture: Some contributions find that evasion tends to increase with higher incomes (e.g. Clotfelter, 1983), others do
not find any significant results (e.g. Feinstein, 1991). Compare also Andreoni et al. (1998, pp.838) and the references
therein.
27See e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997).
16
Appendix
A1. Second Order Conditions
From (8) we can easily derive
∂g
∂τ
= x¯− τ (1− ps)
∫
y
∂e(y)∗
∂τ
dF (y). (A.1)
As both V ′ and x(.) are strictly positive, it follows from (9) respectively (11), that for the voting
equilibrium as well as for the welfare maximizing policy there holds ∂g/∂τ > 0. Hence, the tax
policy is on the upward-sloping side of the Laffer-curve.
The second order condition to (9) is given by
V ′′
(
∂g
∂τ
)2
− (1− ps)
[
2V ′
∫
y
∂e∗(y)
∂τ
dF (y)− yi∂e
∗
i
∂τ
]
≤ 0, (A.2)
where we have substituted for
∂2g
∂τ2
= −2 (1− ps)
∫
y
∂e(y)∗
∂τ
dF (y) < 0. (A.3)
While the first term in (A.2) is strictly negative, the second term is negative if the expression in
the squared brackets is positive. We assume that the marginal utility of the public good V ′ is
high enough, such that this sufficient condition holds for all yi ∈ [yl, yh].
The second order condition to the Samuelson condition from (11) is given by
V ′′
(
∂g
∂τ
)2
− (1− ps) (2V ′ − 1) ∫ y∂e(y)∗
∂τ
dF (y) ≤ 0, (A.4)
where we have substituted for (A.3). As the first term in (A.4) is strictly negative, it is sufficient
for (A.4) to be fulfilled that 2V ′(g) > 1. This is assumed to hold.
A2. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us denote the tax rate preferred by the agent with a taxed income
xˆ as τˆ . Consider a vote between τˆ and a tax rate τ ′ < τˆ . The higher tax rate will be clearly
preferred by all agents with x ≤ xˆ. Hence, the fraction of the population that prefers τ ′ over
τˆ is less than H(xˆ) = 12 . From this follows that no tax rate lower than τˆ can defeat τˆ by an
absolute majority. From the same argument follows that no tax rater higher than τˆ can win a
majority vote against τˆ . Hence, the taxpayer with xˆ is pivotal.
Proof of Proposition 2. 1. Substituting (4) in (10) and using cey ≥ τ(1−ps)−ψ(y) ∀y ∈ [yl, yh],
it follows that ∂x(y)∂y ≥ 0 for all income levels. Hence, the ranking of taxpayers according to
their true income y corresponds to the ranking according to the taxed income x. From this and
Proposition 1 immediately follows that the median income receiver is also pivotal.
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2. Following the steps from above, the existence of a true income y′ ∈ [yl, yh] for which cey <
τ(1 − ps) − ψ(y′) implies that ∂x(y′)∂y < 0 holds for y′. Therefore, the ranking of taxpayers
according to their true income y does no longer correspond to the ranking according to the
taxed income x.
2.a Consider the case where ∃y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and @y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) >
x(ym). The median income receiver can not be pivotal as there is a majority – formed by all
agents with y ∈ [yl, ym] as well as those agents with y ∈ (ym, yh] : x(y) ≤ x(ym) – with a
taxed income lower than (or equal to) the median income receiver’s taxed income. Formally,
H (x(ym)) > 12 . From this follows that the decisive voter must have a taxed income xˆ < x(y
m).
2.b Consider now the case where @y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and ∃y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) >
x(ym). Again, the median income receiver can not be pivotal. All agents with y ∈ [ym, yh] as
well as those agents with y ∈ [yl, ym) who have x(y) ≥ x(ym) form a majority, who have a
higher (or equal) taxed income than the median income receiver. We get H (x(ym)) < 12 and
the political equilibrium must be characterized by a taxpayer with xˆ > x(ym).
2.c If ∃y ∈ (ym, yh] with x(y) < x(ym) and ∃y ∈ [yl, ym) with x(y) > x(ym) it is ambiguous
whether H (x(ym)) is bigger or small than 12 . Consequently we can get either the case from 2.a
or 2.b above. For the special case where H (x(ym)) = 12 we can also get yˆ = y
m.
2.d If @y ∈ (ym, yh]with x(y) ≤ x(ym) and @y ∈ [yl, ym)with x(y) ≥ x(ym), the non-monotonicity
of x(y) does not alter the position of the median income receiver as the agent with the median
taxed income. We get H (x(ym)) = 12 and therefore yˆ = y
m.
Proof of Proposition 3. As V ′, xˆ and x¯ are strictly positive, there has to hold ∂g/∂τ > 0. Since
V ′′ < 0, Proposition 3 then follows from the comparison of (11) with (9), evaluated at x(y) = xˆ.
A3. Income Distributions, Evasion and Welfare
Example 1. Let us first consider an example, where x(y) is monotonic in income as specified
in Proposition 2.1. We use the following specifications: The evasion cost function is given by
c (e, y) = e2
(
y1/20 − y 1
30
)
(A.5)
and the policy parameters are set at p = 0.05, s = 8 and τ = 0.35. Assuming that y ∈ [ 11000 , 6],
one can easily show that ∂x(y)y > 0 as well as
∂x2(y)
y2
< 0 holds for this specifications: while there
is little tax evasion for lower and medium income levels – e∗(y) varies between 0.01 and 0.27
for y ≤ 3 – the very rich evade huge parts of their income – e∗(y) peaks at 0.58 for y = 6.
Let income be distributed according to the following step-function
F (y) = α
min
(
y − yl; ys − yl)
ys − yl + (1− α)
max (y − ys; 0)
(yh − ys) , (A.6)
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with yl = 11000 , y
s = 1, yh = 6 and α = 0.3. Note, that for this parameter values there holds
ym < y¯, i.e. the median income is below the average income.
With this specifications, we can now compute x(y) respectively x¯. From Proposition 2.1
we know, that in this example the median income receiver is also pivotal. Hence, x(ym) =
xˆ. A comparison of the decisive voter’s taxed income and the average income then shows,
that xˆ > x¯. The voting equilibrium in this example is characterized by an under-provision
of public goods, despite an income distribution with ym < y¯ and a monotonically increasing
taxed income x(y).
Figure 3: Distribution of True and Taxed Income
Example 2. Let us consider now an example where tax evasion follows the pattern speci-
fied in Proposition 2.2. We use the same evasion costs as in (A.5). The policy parameters are set
at p = 0.05, s = 5 and τ = 0.35. The left panel shows the resulting pattern of taxed income. As
compared to the example from above, the punishment rate is now lower. Therefore, evasion
is now more widespread. Moreover, x(y) is now decreasing for the very rich as in Figure 1
(compare Proposition 2.2).
The income distribution is now given by a Weibull-distribution (µ = 0, α = 2, β = 1.75
with a truncation at yh = 6). On the right panel of Figure 3 we plotted the density function f(y)
corresponding to our Weibull-distribution. The density function h(x) stems from the distribu-
tion of taxed incomes H(x) in this example. While there holds ym < y¯, the pattern of evasion
underlying the shape of x(y) transforms the income distribution into a distribution of taxed
incomes, which is approximately symmetric. The numerical example shows that indeed xˆ > x¯
holds. Hence, majority voting again results in an under-provision of public goods.
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